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OPINION OF THE COURT  
______________ 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Plaintiff, Jeffrey Wiest, appeals from the District Court’s 
order granting summary judgment to defendant, Tyco 
Electronics Corporation (“Tyco”), in his action alleging that 
Tyco violated the anti-retaliation provision of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A.  Wiest, formerly a Tyco 
employee, claims that Tyco unlawfully terminated his 
employment for reporting suspected securities fraud violations 
pertaining to the accounting treatment of two Tyco events.  
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Specifically, Wiest claims that he engaged in a six-month 
“anguished field battle” during which he frustrated Tyco’s 
management with his refusals as an accountant to process 
payments allegedly due from Tyco that, insofar as germane to 
this appeal, related to two Tyco employee and dealer meetings 
in resort settings.   
 Tyco, on the other hand, contends that Wiest’s 
involvement with the specific events at issue was minimal and 
he did not frustrate, or even inconvenience, anyone in Tyco’s 
management by his conduct.  Tyco asserts that more than eight 
months after he engaged in what he contends was protected 
activity, Tyco’s human resources director—who had no 
involvement with, or knowledge of, Wiest’s protected activity—
conducted an investigation after she received multiple 
complaints that Wiest made inappropriate sexual comments to 
several female Tyco employees, and that he had inappropriate 
sexual relationships with two subordinates during his 
employment.  Tyco argues that the findings from this 
investigation caused it to take employment actions with respect 
to Wiest unrelated to the accounting issues he had raised. 
 We conclude that Wiest has failed to offer any evidence 
to establish that his protected activity was a contributing factor 
to any adverse employment action that Tyco took against him.  
Specifically, the record is devoid of any evidence that Wiest’s 
conduct frustrated personnel in management or that, even if he 
frustrated management personnel, any such individual was 
involved in the investigation and an ultimate recommendation to 
terminate his employment.  Further, even if Wiest could satisfy 
those threshold requirements, Tyco has demonstrated that it 
would have taken the same actions with respect to Wiest in the 
absence of Wiest’s accounting activity given the thorough, and 
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thoroughly documented, investigation conducted by its human 
resources director.  Because there are no genuine issues of 
material fact with respect to Wiest’s anti-retaliation claim under 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, we will affirm the District Court’s 
grant of summary judgment.   
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL 
BACKGROUND 
 We review the record in the light most favorable to the 
party opposing summary judgment—here, the plaintiff.  See 
Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 210 (3d Cir. 2010).  
Nevertheless, we do not at the summary judgment stage of 
proceedings accept as true allegations unsupported in the record. 
 See Williams v. Borough of West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460 
(3d Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted) (“[E]ven though the 
right to a jury trial is implicated, a nonmoving party must 
adduce more than a mere scintilla of evidence in its favor and 
cannot simply reassert factually unsupported allegations 
contained in its pleadings.”).   
 A.  The Protected Activity 
 Wiest at all relevant times was Tyco’s Accounts Payable 
Manager.  In that capacity he oversaw the processing and 
payment of expense reimbursements for various business units 
within Tyco.  The present action stems from Wiest’s 
involvement with expenses and invoices submitted in 
connection with two1 Tyco events, both of which involved its 
                                                 
1 Wiest’s initial complaint alleged that he engaged in other 
protected actions, but we previously determined that all but two 
of those actions, those relating to the two events that we discuss 
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Wireless Business Unit.     
 The first event at issue is the M/A-Com Annual 
Recognition Event in the Bahamas (“the Bahamas Event”), 
which was a sales incentive program to reward sales associates 
and independent dealers who achieved or exceeded their sales 
targets in the preceding year.  On May 28, 2008, Accounts 
Payable received an email in which Tyco’s Wireless Business 
Unit requested immediate payment of an invoice in the amount 
of $56,000 for expenses related to the Bahamas Event.  The 
following day, Wiest’s subordinate, Catherine Smith—an 
Accounts Payable Supervisor—emailed Kevin Kelleher, the 
Wireless Business Unit’s Director of Accounting, to request the 
business purpose of the event, a list of attendees, and a 
verification of the accounting charge.  When she did not receive 
a response, Smith again requested this information on June 2, 
2008.   
 The next day, June 3, 2008, Wiest emailed his supervisor, 
Doug Hofsass, to request the same information that Smith 
previously had sought.  Hofsass then contacted Tyco’s tax 
department for assistance with these requests.  Wiest 
acknowledges that his sole involvement with the Bahamas Event 
was his June 3, 2008 email and that Hofsass, his supervisor, 
handled all communications with the tax department to resolve 
the above-noted inquiries.  He likewise acknowledges that 
Hofsass agreed that more information was needed and supported 
Wiest’s inquiry requesting that information.  Ultimately, Tyco’s 
Chief Financial Officer, Terrence Curtin, concluded that the 
                                                                                                             
in this opinion, were pled insufficiently and could not withstand 
defendants’ motion to dismiss.  See Wiest v. Lynch, 710 F.3d 
121, 136-37 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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event should be treated as taxable compensation to the attending 
employees.  As a consequence, Tyco decided to “gross-up” the 
attending employees’ compensation in order to cover the 
employees’ previously unanticipated tax liability.  Beyond the 
June 3 email, there is no evidence in the record that Wiest made 
any challenges to Tyco’s payment for the Bahamas Event or its 
treatment of the tax implications to Tyco employees who 
attended the event. 
 The second event at issue is the Wireless Systems 
Segment Business Review Meeting at the Wintergreen Resort in 
Virginia (“the Wintergreen Event”).  On October 8, 2008, Smith 
received a request to make a $100,000 down payment for the 
Wintergreen Event.  She responded to the request by seeking 
information regarding the meeting’s agenda and a list of 
attendees.  In response to Smith’s request for additional 
information, Kelleher added that approval from Tyco Chief 
Executive Officer, Thomas Lynch, was required.  Smith 
received the requested information but without the CEO 
approval.  Consequently, Kelleher emailed Chuck Dougherty, 
Tyco’s President, to inform him that “Accounts Payable requires 
express approval from Tom Lynch.”  (App. 1326).  That email 
copied several people from Accounts Payable, including Smith 
and Hofsass, but not Wiest.  Moreover, the email requested that 
copies of return emails regarding this event be sent to Smith and 
Hofsass.     
 Two days later, on October 10, 2008, Kelleher emailed 
Dougherty to follow up on his earlier communication.  In that 
correspondence, Kelleher clarified that approval from CFO 
Curtin with a copy to CEO Lynch would suffice, given that 
Lynch was on vacation.  Dougherty then emailed Curtin to 
request the necessary approval.  Curtin responded to Dougherty, 
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with a copy to Kelleher, approving the payment.  Kelleher then 
forwarded that approval to Smith, Hofsass, and Wiest.  Notably, 
this was Wiest’s first involvement in the accounting aspects of 
the Wintergreen Event.  Wiest emailed Curtin, with copies to 
Smith and Hofsass, to clarify that Curtin was approving the 
entire cost of the event, a total of $355,000, and his approval 
was not limited to the $100,000 down payment.  In that email, 
Wiest asked Curtin to copy Lynch with his response.  Curtin 
thereafter replied and confirmed his approval for the entire cost 
of the event, but he did not copy Lynch.  An hour later, Wiest 
emailed Hofsass and copied Smith to note again the lack of 
approval from, or notification to, Tyco’s CEO, Lynch.  Wiest 
stated that he would “leave it to [Hofsass’s] discretion” as to 
how to involve Lynch and obtain the requisite approval.  There 
is no record that Wiest had any additional concerns about 
approval for the Wintergreen Event or concerns about any other 
issue pertaining to the event. 
 The crux of Wiest’s complaint is that Tyco unlawfully 
terminated him in retaliation for his conduct in the matters that 
we describe above.  He characterizes the back and forth 
regarding these events as an “anguished field battle” between 
himself and Tyco management.  (See Appellant’s br. at 9).  
Specifically, he alleges that Tyco “discharged him in retaliation 
for protected disclosures relating to fraudulent accounting 
practice, attempted shareholder fraud, and lack of compliance 
with United States Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(‘GAAP’).”  (App. 229).  Tyco contends that to the extent that it 
took adverse employment action against Wiest when it decided 
to terminate his employment as a result of its human resources 
director’s investigation of his conduct, it did not do so because 
of Wiest’s actions with respect to the Bahamas or Wintergreen 
Events.   
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 B.  Wiest’s Concurrent Review 
 On June 13, 2008—ten days after Wiest’s protected 
activity concerning the Bahamas Event—Hofsass distributed an 
email to several Tyco employees to inform them that June 19, 
2008, would be Wiest’s 30-year anniversary with Tyco.  This 
email identified Wiest as a “key factor” in a particular Tyco 
accounting initiative and noted his other “significant 
contributions” to Tyco over the years.  (App. 267).  It also 
encouraged the email recipients to acknowledge Wiest and 
congratulate him on this anniversary.   
 On July 30, 2008—nearly two months after Wiest’s 
protected activity concerning the Bahamas Event—Wiest 
received the maximum possible “Impact Bonus” in the amount 
of 10% his annual base salary.  The Impact Bonus 
Recommendation identified Wiest’s “focus on ‘doing the right 
thing’” as well as his “significant achievements” within the 
accounting department as the basis for awarding the maximum 
possible bonus.  (App. 1113).  On October 23, 2008—two 
weeks after the last protected activity pertaining to the 
Wintergreen Event—Wiest received the highest possible ratings 
in his annual review. 
   C.  Tyco’s Investigation of Wiest 
 We start our discussion of the investigation of Wiest with 
a telephone call that Hofsass made on August 7, 2009, to Tyco’s 
human resources director, Susan Wallace.  In that call, Hofsass 
informed Wallace that Mark Williams—one of Hofsass’s 
subordinates—had received complaints that Wiest made 
inappropriate sexual comments to several Tyco employees.  On 
August 11, 2009, Wallace met with Williams and Hofsass to 
obtain additional information.  During this meeting, Williams 
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provided names of several women who were either targets of, or 
witnesses to, the alleged inappropriate behavior.  Wallace then 
scheduled interviews with individuals potentially involved as 
well as other individuals who worked closely with Wiest.  
Hofsass relayed his concerns about the allegations and stated 
that he had been completely unaware that Wiest had engaged in 
this conduct. 
 In making her investigation, Wallace interviewed at least 
ten employees, including Wiest.  Three female employees 
relayed information concerning multiple unwanted sexual 
remarks from Wiest.2  Each of these women reported that she 
                                                 
2 The District Court listed several of the inappropriate comments 
of which Wallace was informed during her investigation, all of 
which are set forth in Wallace’s investigation report:   
 
(1) that [N.Q.’s] flexibility must be great for sex 
and her husband must enjoy it; (2) in response to 
[N.Q.] saying, ‘I have a proposition for you,’ 
asking if a coworker should leave the room; (3) 
after approaching [N.Q.] at her desk late in the 
day in 2005 and engaging her in an unwanted 
conversation that lasted over an hour (and 
included a lunch invitation), suggesting that his 
taste for exotic foods translates to a willingness to 
try new things in the bedroom, and stating that he 
was unable to assess whether [N.Q.’s] taste for 
exotic foods would translate into her bedroom 
performance; (4) commenting about [B.S.’s] body 
in a way that made her uncomfortable; (5) 
discussing nude beaches and the use of tea as an 
aphrodisiac with [B.S.], knowing that [B.S.] was a 
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felt uncomfortable and “trapped” when Wiest approached her.  
Wallace also learned that women in the office had created a 
system by which they could alert each other of Wiest’s 
whereabouts—a system to which they sometimes referred as a 
“Jeff Alert.”  Wiest concedes that the three women who made 
the initial complaints of unwanted sexual remarks were unaware 
of his activity with respect to the Bahamas and Wintergreen 
Events.   
                                                                                                             
regular tea drinker; (6) upon learning that [B.S.’s] 
husband had given her Christmas gifts for her 
home, asking, ‘No Victoria’s Secret gift card?’; 
(7) telling [B.S.] that he missed his wife’s 
pregnancy hormones and the positive impact they 
had on their sex life, knowing [B.S.] was 
pregnant; (8) asking to see pictures from [A.M.’s] 
bachelorette party, and then telling her about a 
‘fling’ he had with a girl 17 years younger than 
him who was engaged, which he described as ‘fun 
for everyone’ and ‘her last hurrah’; (9) telling 
[A.M.] that cruises were a bad idea for 
honeymoons because the couple may be too far 
away from the boat if they had ‘urges,’ knowing 
[A.M.] was getting married; and (10) after 
receiving a sign that read ‘The Big One’ in honor 
of his 50th birthday, telling [D.W.] he was going 
to take the sign home and put it on his bedroom 
door. 
 
Wiest v. Tyco Elecs. Corp., No. 10-3288, 2015 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 47935, at *8-9 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 2015). 
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 Three other employees reported that they witnessed 
Wiest make sexual remarks, witnessed Wiest brag about 
previous sexual relationships with women in the office, and/or 
heard about the sexual remarks and sexual relationships from 
others in the office.  Finally, three employees initially reported 
that they had no knowledge of any inappropriate behavior by 
Wiest, but two of these three employees sought follow-up 
conversations with Wallace to clarify that they were aware that 
Wiest had had relationships with women in the office.  While 
several of these interviews identified inappropriate conduct from 
earlier years, the investigation also uncovered contemporaneous 
documentation to support many of those allegations.   
 On September 17, 2009, Wallace interviewed Wiest in 
the presence of another human resources employee who 
documented the interview.  At that time, Wiest denied having 
prior sexual relationships with any Tyco employee and denied 
making any of the sexual comments reported to Wallace.  Wiest 
admitted that he had several dates with a subordinate more than 
nine years before, but stated that the relationship never 
progressed to a point that would have required him to report the 
relationship to anyone at Tyco.   
 The following day, September 18, 2009, Wiest called 
Wallace to clarify some of the statements he made during his 
interview.  Wallace scheduled a meeting for later that day, 
during which Wiest stated that any comments he may have made 
were an attempt at humor, and while perhaps they were 
misplaced, he did not think any of them crossed any lines.  
Wiest also requested the opportunity to apologize to anyone he 
may have offended, but he acknowledged that some people may 
not have wanted to have contact with him.   
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 On September 30, 2009, Wallace met with several Tyco 
employees, including Hofsass, Charles Post, an attorney in 
Tyco’s legal department, and Robert Ott, Tyco’s Corporate 
Controller and Hofsass’s superior.  At that meeting, she 
indicated that she had made a preliminary decision to terminate 
Wiest pending a final meeting to allow him another opportunity 
to respond to her findings from the investigation.  Wallace 
scheduled this final meeting for the following day, October 1, 
2009.  But before this final meeting could occur, Wiest went out 
on short-term disability and he never returned to work at Tyco.  
On March 31, 2010, Tyco administratively terminated his 
employment because his short-term disability benefits had 
expired and he still was unable to return to work.   
 D.  Procedural History 
 Wiest filed an administrative complaint with the U.S. 
Department of Labor on November 24, 2009, in which he 
asserted that Tyco had retaliated against him for his protected 
activity in his accounting capacity.  In accordance with 18 
U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(B), he filed this action in the District 
Court on July 7, 2010, after he did not receive a final decision 
from the Department of Labor within 180 days of the filing of 
the administrative complaint.  Wiest filed the initial District 
Court complaint on behalf of himself and his wife, Laura Wiest, 
against Tyco, Thomas Lynch, Terrence Curtin, Charles Post, 
and Charles Dougherty.  The complaint contained four causes of 
action: Count I: violation of the anti-retaliation provision of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A; Count II: intentional 
infliction of emotional distress; Count III: wrongful termination; 
and Count IV: loss of consortium.   
 On July 21, 2010, the District Court granted the 
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defendants’ motion to dismiss Count I for failure to state a claim 
on the ground that Wiest had failed to plead sufficient facts to 
support a finding that he engaged in protected activity.  See 
Wiest v. Lynch, No. 10-3288, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79283 
(E.D. Pa. July 21, 2011).  In support of this decision, the Court 
relied, at least in part, on a superseded agency decision of the 
Administrative Review Board (“ARB”), which had established 
that “[f]or a communication to be protected, it must ‘definitively 
and specifically’ relate to one of the statutes or rules listed in” 
18 U.S.C. § 1514A which precludes retaliation against an 
employee for taking steps against certain unlawful company 
activities of which he is aware.  Id. at *12-13 (citing Platone v. 
FLYi, Inc., ARB No. 04-154, 2006 DOLSOX LEXIS 105 
(Dep’t of Labor Sept. 29, 2006)).  The Court dismissed the 
remaining three counts of the complaint as its only basis for 
jurisdiction over them was supplemental to its jurisdiction over 
Count I which it was dismissing.  Id. at *30.  Wiest moved for 
reconsideration but on November 16, 2011, the Court denied 
that motion.  See Wiest v. Lynch, No. 10-3288, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 132114 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2011). 
 On March 19, 2013, we partially reversed the District 
Court’s order of dismissal and remanded the case for further 
proceedings.  See Wiest v. Lynch, 710 F.3d 121, 134, 138 (3d 
Cir. 2013).  Specifically, in a divided decision we held that the 
District Court erred in relying on the “definitively and 
specifically” standard from Platone which required that for a 
communication to be protected it must definitively and 
specifically relate to a statute or rule listed in the anti-retaliation 
section of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A.  We 
pointed out that the ARB had supplanted the Platone standard in 
Sylvester v. Parexel Int’l LLC, ARB No. 07-123, 2011 
DOLSOX LEXIS 39 (Dep’t of Labor May 25, 2011).  We 
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concluded that the Sylvester standard—which protects a 
communication when “the employee has both a subjective and 
an objective belief that the conduct that is the subject of the 
communication relates to an existing or prospective violation of 
one of the federal laws referenced” in 18 U.S.C. § 1514A—was 
entitled to Chevron deference.  Wiest, 710 F.3d at 130-31 (citing 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 
837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781-82 (1984)).  The majority 
then applied the Sylvester standard to Wiest’s complaint and 
concluded that with respect to the Bahamas and Wintergreen 
Events, he adequately had pled facts that, if true, could 
constitute protected activity under 18 U.S.C. § 1514A.  Id. at 
134-38.  Consequently, we remanded the case with respect to 
those two communications.3   
 Following remand, the defendants filed a second motion 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim, which the District Court 
granted in part and denied in part.  See Wiest v. Lynch, 15 F. 
Supp. 3d 543 (E.D. Pa. 2014).4  The Court rejected the 
                                                 
3 Judge Jordan dissented on the ground that the Sylvester 
standard is “impossibly vague” and therefore should not receive 
Chevron deference.  Wiest, 710 F.3d at 142 (Jordan, J., 
dissenting). Moreover, Judge Jordan concluded that, even 
applying the objective reasonableness standard of Sylvester, 
Wiest failed to state a claim because the communications 
alleged did not amount to allegations of fraud, as is required for 
a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1514A.  Id. at 144 (Jordan, J., 
dissenting).   
 
4 The lapse of time between the remand and any further 
proceedings was attributable to the District Court’s 
determination to place the case in suspense pending the Supreme 
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defendants’ assertions that Wiest had not sufficiently pled either 
an adverse employment action or a sufficient causal connection 
between the protected activity and any adverse employment 
action.  See id. at 558-67.  The Court granted the motion, 
however, with respect to three of the four individually named 
defendants—Lynch, Curtin, and Post—but concluded that Wiest 
had “just barely state[d] a claim” with respect to the fourth 
individual, Dougherty.  Id. at 566-67.   
 In November 2014, Wiest filed an amended complaint, in 
which he no longer named Dougherty as a defendant, and, on 
the same date, he stipulated to the dismissal of all claims against 
Dougherty with prejudice.  After the parties filed briefs on 
Tyco’s motion for summary judgment, Wiest withdrew his 
claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and 
wrongful discharge as a separate cause of action but not as a part 
of his anti-retaliation claim, and his wife withdrew her claim for 
loss of consortium.  Wiest v. Tyco Elecs. Corp., No. 10-3288, 
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47935, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 2015).  
Consequently, the sole issue before the District Court on the 
motion for summary judgment was whether there was a genuine 
issue of material fact with respect to Wiest’s anti-retaliation 
claim against Tyco pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1514A.  See id.  The 
Court granted Tyco’s motion on April 13, 2015, reasoning that 
there was insufficient evidence for a jury to find that Wiest’s 
                                                                                                             
Court’s decision in Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S.Ct. 1158 
(2014).  The District Court believed that Lawson could clarify a 
disputed issue regarding the retroactivity of § 929A of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, which extended the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to 
wholly-owned subsidiaries of publicly traded corporations.  See 
Wiest, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 550-51.  We are not concerned with this 
issue on this appeal.   
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protected activity was a contributing factor in Tyco’s 
preliminary or final decision to terminate Wiest’s employment.  
Id. at *36-37.  Wiest appealed the grant of summary judgment to 
Tyco.5 
 
III.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF 
REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over Wiest’s amended 
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1367 
and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
exercise plenary review over a district court’s grant of summary 
judgment.  Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 
(3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 1738 (2015); Haybarger 
v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 667 F.3d 408, 412 (3d 
Cir. 2012).  Therefore, we consider this matter on a basis 
identical to that of the District Court.  See Santini v. Fuentes, 
795 F.3d 410, 416 (3d Cir. 2015).  Summary judgment is 
warranted when the movant establishes that there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Schaar v. Lehigh 
Valley Health Servs., Inc., 598 F.3d 156, 157 (3d Cir. 2010).  
“A fact is ‘material’ under Rule 56 if its existence or 
                                                 
5 In his brief, Wiest also challenges two discovery-related 
orders:  (1) the District Court’s grant of a protective order to bar 
the deposition of Tyco CEO Thomas Lynch, and (2) the Court’s 
denial of Wiest’s motion to compel two depositions, which he 
filed three months after completion of the time for discovery.  
We, however, are satisfied that the Court did not abuse its 
discretion in making these dispositions and we see no reason to 
discuss them further. 
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nonexistence might impact the outcome of the suit under the 
applicable substantive law.  A dispute over a material fact is 
‘genuine’ if ‘a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 
nonmoving party.’”  Santini, 795 F.3d 410, 416 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 
106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986)).   
 The moving party bears the initial burden to identify 
“specific portions of the record that establish the absence of a 
genuine issue of material fact.”  Santini, 795 F.3d at 416 (citing 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 
2553 (1986)).  If the moving party satisfies its burden, the 
burden then “shifts to the nonmoving party to go beyond the 
pleadings and ‘come forward with specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial.’”  Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. 
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 
1348, 1356 (1986)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).  While we 
view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party, conjecture and speculation will not create a genuine issue 
of material fact sufficient to withstand the grant of summary 
judgment.  Acumed LLC v. Advanced Surgical Servs., Inc., 561 
F.3d 199, 228 (3d Cir. 2009); Lexington Ins. Co. v. W. Pa. 
Hosp., 423 F.3d 318, 333 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Hedberg v. 
Indiana Bell Tel. Co., Inc., 47 F.3d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(“Speculation does not create a genuine issue of fact; instead it 
creates a false issue, the demolition of which is a primary goal 
of summary judgment.”)).   
 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
 Wiest asserts a claim for unlawful retaliation in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1514A.  That provision protects whistleblowing 
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employees from retaliation for providing information, either 
directly or indirectly, about certain types of expressly 
enumerated illegal activities.  See id. § 1514A(a)(1)-(2).  The 
statute provides, in relevant part, that: 
no [publicly-traded] company . . . 
or any officer, employee, 
contractor, subcontractor, or agent 
of such company . . . may 
discharge, demote, suspend, 
threaten, harass, or in any other 
manner discriminate against an 
employee in the terms and 
conditions of employment because 
of any lawful act done by the 
employee— 
(1) to provide information, cause 
information to be provided, or 
otherwise assist in an investigation 
regarding any conduct which the 
employee reasonably believes 
constitutes a violation of section 
1341 [mail fraud], 1343 [wire 
fraud], 1344 [bank fraud], or 1348 
[securities fraud], any rule or 
regulation of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, or any 
provision of Federal law relating to 
fraud against shareholders, when 
the information or assistance is 
provided to or the investigation is 
conducted by – 
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(A) a Federal regulatory or law 
enforcement agency; 
(B) any Member of Congress or 
any committee of Congress; or 
(C) a person with supervisory 
authority over the employee (or 
such other person working for the 
employer who has the authority to 
investigate, discover, or terminate 
misconduct)[.] 
Id. § 1514A(a)(1)(A)-(C). 
 The statute incorporates by reference the rules and 
procedures applicable to the Wendell H. Ford Aviation 
Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (“AIR-21”).  
See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(C) (citing 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)).  
Pursuant to that incorporation, the Department of Labor has 
promulgated a regulation that applies AIR-21’s two-part burden-
shifting framework to Sarbanes-Oxley complaints.  See 29 
C.F.R. § 1980.104(e)(2)-(4).  Thus, to withstand Tyco’s motion 
for summary judgment, Wiest must identify evidence in the 
record from which a jury could deduce the following:  (1) he 
“engaged in a protected activity”; (2) Tyco “knew or suspected 
that [he] engaged in the protected activity”; (3) he “suffered an 
adverse action”; and (4) “the protected activity was a 
contributing factor[6] in the adverse action alleged in the 
                                                 
6 Wiest contends that he only need show that “the circumstances 
were sufficient to raise the inference that the protected activity 
was a contributing factor in the adverse action.”  (See 
Appellant’s br. at 44 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1980.104(e)(2))).  That 
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complaint.”  Id. §§ 1980.104(e)(2)(i)-(iv), 1980.109(a); accord 
Araujo v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 708 F.3d 152, 157 
(3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Allen v. Admin. Review Bd., 514 F.3d 
468, 475-76 (5th Cir. 2008)).  If Wiest satisfies his burden to 
identify evidence to support all four elements, the burden will 
shift to Tyco to demonstrate “by clear and convincing evidence 
that [it] would have taken the same [adverse] action in the 
absence of [any protected activity].”  29 C.F.R. § 1980.109(b); 
accord Araujo, 708 F.3d at 157 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 
42121(b)(2)(B)(ii)).   
 Tyco based its motion for summary judgment on its 
assertion that Wiest had not identified any evidence in the 
record from which a jury could conclude that Wiest’s protected 
activity was a contributing factor to any adverse action that it 
may have taken against him.  See Wiest, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
47935, at *18-19.  Alternatively, Tyco argued that it would have 
taken the same action even in the absence of the protected 
activity.  Id. at *19.7    Because we find that Wiest has not 
                                                                                                             
standard, however, governs a complainant’s ability to proceed 
with an investigation at the outset.  As § 1980.109(a) declares, 
“[a] determination that a violation has occurred may be made 
only if the complainant has demonstrated by a preponderance of 
the evidence that protected activity was a contributing factor in 
the adverse action alleged in the complaint.”  Thus, at this stage 
of the proceedings, Wiest must identify evidence in the record 
on which a jury could base a finding that the protected activity 
contributed to Tyco’s adverse employment action against him.   
 
7 Both Tyco and the District Court have assumed for purposes of 
the summary judgment motion that Wiest could demonstrate that 
he had engaged in protected activity with respect to the 
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identified any record evidence to establish causation, we will 
affirm the District Court’s order granting summary judgment to 
defendant Tyco. 
A.  Appellant’s Procedural Argument 
 As a threshold matter, Wiest argues that Tyco’s summary 
judgment motion was procedurally barred by previous decisions 
in this case by application of the doctrine of the law of the case. 
 Specifically, Wiest contends that in light of our and the District 
Court’s previous conclusions that Wiest’s complaint sufficiently 
alleged all four elements of a prima facie case at the motion-to-
dismiss stage, he now is entitled to proceed to a jury trial.   
 This argument fails based on Wiest’s critical 
misapplication of the fundamental distinction between a motion 
to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and a motion for summary 
judgment under Rule 56.  While at the motion-to-dismiss stage 
of proceedings a district court is obligated to accept the 
allegations in a plaintiff’s complaint as true, it does not accept 
mere allegations as true at the summary judgment stage.  See 
Berckeley Inv. Group, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d 
Cir. 2006).  To the contrary, “summary judgment is essentially 
‘put up or shut up’ time for the non-moving party” who “must 
rebut the motion with facts in the record and cannot rest solely 
on assertions made in the pleadings, legal memoranda, or oral 
argument.”  Id.  Moreover, “if the non-moving party has the 
burden of proof at trial, that party must set forth facts sufficient 
to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s 
case.”  Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).   
 As the District Court aptly noted, when it “ruled on 
                                                                                                             
Bahamas and Wintergreen Events.  We do as well. 
22 
 
Tyco’s Motion to Dismiss, the analysis centered on whether 
[Wiest’s] allegations, if true, stated a claim for relief.  Now, the 
issue is whether [Wiest has] come forward with sufficient 
evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the 
allegations are, indeed, true.”  Wiest, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
47935, at *17.  In light of this critical distinction, Wiest’s law of 
the case argument is meritless. 
 B.  Contributing Factor 
 In considering the merits of Tyco’s motion, we next 
address whether there is any evidence to support Wiest’s claim 
that his protected activity was a factor that contributed to Tyco 
taking the adverse action from which he suffered.  While we 
seem not yet to have analyzed this element of an anti-retaliation 
claim under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, other courts of appeals 
have done so and have defined a contributing factor as “any 
factor, which alone or in combination with other factors, tends 
to affect in any way the outcome of the decision.”  Feldman v. 
Law Enforcement Assocs. Corp., 752 F.3d 339, 348 (4th Cir. 
2014); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Admin. Review Bd., 717 F.3d 
1121, 1136 (10th Cir. 2013); Allen, 514 F.3d at 476 n.3.  A 
plaintiff need not provide direct evidence to satisfy this element; 
rather, circumstantial evidence may be sufficient.  See, e.g., Van 
Asdale v. Int’l Game Tech., 577 F.3d 989, 1003 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 To that end, “‘[t]emporal proximity between the protected 
activity and the adverse action is a significant factor in 
considering a circumstantial showing of causation.’”  Feldman, 
752 F.3d at 348 (quoting Tice v. Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., No. 
2006-SOX-20, 2006 DOLSOX LEXIS 44, at *20 (Dep’t of 
Labor Apr. 26, 2006)).  Conversely, a “‘causal connection may 
be severed by the passage of a significant amount of time, or by 
some legitimate intervening event.’”  Id. (quoting Halloum v. 
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Intel Corp., No. 2003-SOX-7, 2004 DOLSOX LEXIS 73, at *13 
(Dep’t of Labor Mar. 4, 2004)). 
 With respect to the third element of Wiest’s anti-
retaliation claim—that he suffered an unfavorable personnel 
action—we must, at a minimum, define the unfavorable action 
in order to analyze causation.  In this regard, Wiest contends that 
any one of the following events constituted an adverse 
employment action on which he can base his anti-retaliation 
claim: (1) Tyco constructively discharged him in September 
2009, (2) Tyco preliminarily terminated him on September 30, 
2009, or alternatively (3) Tyco actually terminated him on 
September 30, 2009.  We address each of these theories in turn.  
Significantly, all three of these events occurred prior to Tyco’s 
administrative termination of Wiest’s employment on March 31, 
2010, and Wiest does not contend that, standing alone, the 
March 31, 2010 termination was a retaliatory act.   
1.  Constructive Discharge 
 Wiest alleges that in late August or early September 2009 
“his direct reports and his manager were less communicative 
and began acting differently to him.”  (App. 241).  Wiest 
likewise complains about the stress he felt as a result of his 
interview with Susan Wallace and her investigation.  He claims 
that this stress amounted to a constructive discharge.  But Wiest 
has conceded that Tyco had a duty to investigate when it 
received the complaints from various employees.  In light of this 
duty to investigate, we will not conclude that enduring the 
investigation amounted to, or contributed in any way toward a 
constructive discharge.  With respect to Wiest’s contention that 
his colleagues were “less communicative,” such conduct is 
insufficient to constitute a constructive discharge. 
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 When analyzing a constructive discharge claim at the 
summary judgment stage, we “must determine ‘whether a 
reasonable jury could find that the [employer] permitted 
conditions so unpleasant or difficult that a reasonable person 
would have felt compelled to resign.’”  Duffy v. Paper Magic 
Grp., 265 F.3d 163, 167 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Connors v. 
Chrysler Fin. Corp., 160 F.3d 971, 974 (3d Cir. 1998)).  
Moreover, an employee claiming to have been constructively 
discharged must demonstrate that the conduct of which he 
complains “surpasse[d] a threshold of intolerable conditions.”  
Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 444 (3d Cir. 2003) (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted), vacated on other grounds, 
Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 124 S.Ct. 2342 (2004). 
 Wiest’s contention that he felt isolated from his colleagues is 
simply insufficient to meet this well-established standard.  See 
Duffy, 265 F.3d at 169-70.  Because Wiest has not identified 
any evidence in the record to support his assertion that he was 
constructively discharged, we do not undertake a causation 
analysis with respect to this purported adverse action.   
2.  Preliminary Termination on September 30, 
2009 
 Wiest next argues that Tyco’s preliminary decision to 
terminate his employment  constituted an adverse employment 
action to which his protected activity was a contributing factor.  
Unlike our conclusion that the evidence was inadequate to 
support Wiest’s constructive discharge claim, we are satisfied 
that there is ample evidence in the record from which a jury 
could conclude that Tyco made a preliminary decision to 
terminate Wiest as of September 30, 2009.  We will assume for 
purposes of this analysis that such a preliminary determination is 
an adverse employment action, but we then must determine 
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whether a reasonable jury could conclude that his protected 
activity was a contributing factor in the adverse action.  We find 
that it could not. 
 First, any inference of causation gleaned from temporal 
proximity is minimal in light of the ten-month gap between the 
protected activity and the adverse action.  See, e.g., Riddle v. 
First Tenn. Bank, 497 F. App’x 588, 596 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(finding four-month gap insufficient to infer causation); Miller 
v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 812 F. Supp. 2d 975, 988-89 (D. 
Minn. 2011) (finding eight-month gap insufficient to infer 
causation).  As noted, Wiest last engaged in protected activity 
on October 10, 2008, and the adverse employment action with 
respect to the preliminary determination to terminate him 
occurred in September 2009.  Thus, temporal proximity does not 
support Wiest’s theory of causation.   
 Second, the record overwhelmingly demonstrates 
“legitimate intervening event[s],” such that any causal 
connection that could be derived from the circumstances was 
severed.  See Feldman, 752 F.3d at 348.  Specifically, the record 
demonstrates that: (1) Wiest received praise and commendations 
both during and after his protected activity;8 (2) none of the 
                                                 
8 Several courts have concluded that an employee’s receipt of 
favorable treatment after engaging in protected activity severely 
undermines a claim that there was a causal connection between 
the activity and the adverse employment action.  See, e.g., 
Ameen v. Merck & Co., 226 F. App’x 363, 376 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(finding that employee’s receipt of positive reviews and 
discretionary bonuses in the year following the alleged protected 
activity is “utterly inconsistent with an inference of retaliation”); 
Moticka v. Weck Closure Sys., 183 F. App’x 343, 353 (4th Cir. 
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individuals who initiated the investigation with human resources 
had any knowledge of Wiest’s protected activity; (3) Susan 
Wallace, who conducted the investigation, had no knowledge of 
Wiest’s protected activity;9 (4) Wiest’s colleagues in the 
accounting department who were as involved, or more involved, 
in the same activity did not receive any negative treatment; and 
(5) Tyco’s Wireless Business Unit, the Tyco unit involved in the 
events, was sold to another company in May 2009 and the 
employees who Wiest contends he frustrated remained with the 
unit after the sale and no longer had any involvement with Tyco 
when the investigation was initiated.   
 These uncontroverted facts, both individually and 
collectively, negate any possible inference of causation.  
Consequently, Wiest cannot withstand the motion for summary 
judgment on his theory that his protected activity was a 
                                                                                                             
2006) (noting that when an employee receives favorable 
treatment after the alleged protected activity, “the inference of 
retaliatory motive is undercut”). 
 
9 Wiest asserts that if we reach this conclusion we will be 
engaging in improper fact-finding at the summary judgment 
stage.  Again, however, Wiest fails to acknowledge his burden at 
this phase of the litigation.  We are not obligated to ignore 
uncontroverted evidence—here, Wallace’s signed affidavit—
unless and until Wiest identifies some evidence in the record to 
create a genuine dispute on this fact.  See Pressley v. Johnson, 
268 F. App’x 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Arnold Pontiac-
GMC, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 786 F.2d 564, 581 (3d Cir. 
1986) (“[I]n reviewing grant of summary judgment, appellate 
court cannot ignore uncontested facts that render inferences 
unreasonable.”)). 
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contributing factor in Tyco’s preliminary decision to terminate 
him in late September 2009. 
3.  Final Termination on September 30, 2009 
 Wiest’s final contention with respect to an adverse 
employment action is that he actually was terminated as of 
September 30, 2009.  This argument fails, first, because the 
record unequivocally demonstrates that Tyco administratively 
terminated him on March 31, 2010, after he exhausted his short-
term disability leave.  Thus, there is no evidence to support even 
the threshold premise that Tyco actually terminated his 
employment on September 30, 2009.  Moreover, even if Wiest 
could demonstrate that his employment actually was terminated 
on September 30, 2009, he cannot demonstrate that there was a 
causal connection between his protected activities and the 
adverse employment action for the reasons we have already 
stated.   
 C.  Tyco’s Affirmative Defense 
 Even if we assume that Wiest can establish a factual 
dispute with respect to the issue of whether his protected activity 
was a contributing factor in some adverse employment action by 
Tyco with respect to him, Tyco still is entitled to summary 
judgment as it amply has demonstrated that it would have taken 
the same action in the absence of any protected behavior.  See 
29 C.F.R. § 1980.109(b) (“[R]elief may not be ordered if the 
respondent demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that 
it would have taken the same adverse action in the absence of 
any protected activity.”).  Wiest’s sole challenge to Tyco’s 
affirmative defense is his contention that termination was an 
unreasonably harsh punishment, and, but for his protected 
activity, he would have received a more lenient reprimand.  
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Specifically, he contends that the comments he made “would not 
be found as offensive to the average employee.”  (App. 244).  
But it is not our role to second-guess a human resources decision 
that followed a thorough investigation.  Abels v. DISH Network 
Serv., LLC, 507 F. App’x 179, 185 (3d Cir. 2012) (“We do not 
sit as a super-personnel department that reexamines an entity’s 
business decisions.”); see also Feldman, 752 F.3d at 350 
(extending this logic from Abels to Sarbanes-Oxley claims); 
Riddle, 497 F. App’x at 596 (same).     
 The record in this case demonstrates that Tyco initiated 
an investigation after it received multiple complaints that Wiest 
engaged in improper conduct.  That investigation found ample 
support for those complaints, and Tyco did not violate the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act when it took adverse employment actions 
against him without either warning him or imposing a 
probationary period.10  In short, Wiest has not identified any 
evidence in the record to connect the investigation—either its 
initiation or its results—to his protected activity.  In turn, Wiest 
“has produced no evidence casting doubt on the integrity of the 
investigation” and there is no genuine issue of material fact 
casting doubt on Tyco’s affirmative defense.  See Hemphill v. 
Celanese Corp., 430 F. App’x 341, 345 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
                                                 
10 We are aware that Tyco has a handbook which provides that it 
follows “traditional notions of progressive discipline when 
possible.”  (App. 848).  But the handbook goes on to state that 
“management reserves the right to discipline or terminate 
employees without resorting to prior disciplinary measures.”  Id. 
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 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order for summary judgment entered April 13, 2015. 
 
 
